This paper uses event study analysis to estimate the impact of the Fed's Quantitative Easing (QE) announcements on the mortgage market during zero lower bound period. A total of 35 QE announcements are identified and their effects are evaluated. The best-fitting IGARCH model with skewed t distribution is used to measure the QE announcement effects on daily changes of the 30-year mortgage rate, the 30-year Treasury rate and the spread between them. Announcements suggesting the start of a new round of QE reduced the mortgage rate tremendously, while the effects of further news diminished. Announcements of an increase in mortgage-backed security purchases decreased the mortgage rate more than the Treasury rate and reduced the credit risk of holding mortgage securities over Treasury securities. The long run effects of QE announcements on the mortgage rate were less than short run effects but persistent. We also find that the previous literature overestimate QE effects on interest rates in general.
Introduction
Unconventional monetary policy instruments have been widely employed by central banks in major developed economies (i.e., U.S., U.K., Euro Area and Japan) since the [2007] [2008] financial crisis. Among these instruments, Quantitative Easing (QE) was most widely used by central banks and discussed by researchers. In the U.S., during the zero lower bound (ZLB) period 1 , the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) frequently implemented several rounds of QE such as Large-scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) and Operation Twists 2 (OT). Although the types and quantities of assets purchased by the Fed were not the same during each round, the aim for the Fed's QEs was that by increasing the prices and decreasing the yields of government and agency assets through Fed's purchases, investors were more willing to buy private assets. As a result, better liquidity and less credit constraints were achieved in the market. Mortgage Backed Securities (MBSs) were among the securities purchased by the Fed and thus the yields of MBSs and mortgage rates were expected to be reduced in the course of QEs. Former Chairman of the Fed Ben Bernanke said in his Jackson
Hole Speech on August 31, 2012: "QE program… has been linked to substantial reductions in MBS yields and retail mortgage rates".
While QE effects on asset prices in general are broadly studied, few researchers (Hancock, Passmore, 2011 have looked into the mortgage market. In the broad QE literature, the VAR model is most commonly used to estimate the co-movement of mortgage rates and other asset yields, but the effects of QE announcements on mortgage rates on event day or in an event window have not been investigated until this paper.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the QE announcement effects on the mortgage rate 1 ZLB period started at the end of 2008 when Fed reduced the federal funds rate to be in the range of 0 to 0.25 percent, and concluded at late 2015 when Fed decided to increase the federal funds rate to be in the range of 0.25 to 0.5 percent.
2 Also known as Maturity Extension Program (or MEP).
and the spread over the Treasury rate. Different from Hancock and Passmore (2011 who treat the announcements in the same round of QE as the same event, we consider all 35
announcements as different events and evaluate their effects on the mortgage rate respectively.
In general, we find that announcements of an increase in MBS purchases decreased the mortgage rate more than the Treasury rate and narrowed the spread between the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate. This is consistent with the finding in Di Maggio et al. (2016) : Mortgage rates decreased more in QE1 than in QE2 since the Fed only purchased Treasury bonds in QE2.
Our analysis has several advantages compared to the prior literature. Our data set are updated to the end of 2015 which includes all the Fed's QE announcement events during the ZLB period. Using regression-based event studies to account for the effects reduces concerns regarding endogeneity and overlapping event windows. We use the GARCH model to control for the serial correlation and heteroskedasticity within the data series for better estimating the pure effect of events. We summarize primarily formal methods and econometric evidence in QE announcement effect literature and compare their results with ours. We find the QE announcement effects on the mortgage rate in short run (i.e., on event day and in event windows) and in long run (i.e., assume a steady state). Finally, we categorize the QE announcements by type and summarize their distinct effects.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 1 gives the background and introduction.
Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 3 describes the data sources and descriptive statistics. Section 4 shows the event study methodology and model selection. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 analyzes the case when QE events are grouped by the type of announcements and the round of QE. Section 7 demonstrates two robustness checks and Section 8 concludes the findings.
Literature review

QE announcement effects on interest rates and asset prices
A large amount of literature focuses on estimating the direct effects of QE announcements on long-term interest rates and term premia. Wright (2012) finds that although QE shocks had effects on both long-term interest rates and corporate bond yields, the effect decayed really fast. Jarrow and Li (2012) evaluate the effects of the Fed's QE1 and QE2 on US term premia of interest rates. Li and Wei (2012) conclude that QE1, QE2 and OT combined result in a decrease of about 100 basis points on the 10-year treasury yield.
Hancock and Passmore (2011) evaluate effects of the Fed's MBS purchase program in 2008 (part of QE1) on mortgage rates and MBS yields. They run linear regression of mortgage rates on the determinants and period dummies to conclude that the program lowered the mortgage rates. Hollifield (2011) points out two drawbacks in the research of Hancock and Passmore (2011), which are a nonlinear relationship between MBS yields and their determinants, and endogenous right-hand side regression variables to the Fed's MBS purchase program. Hancock and Passmore (2012) extend the data to include QE2 and OT, modify the determination models of mortgage rates and MBS yields, and model the relation between these two variables. Hancock and Passmore (2015) use a co-integrated, error-correction model to estimate the "stock" and "flow" effect 3 of Fed's LSAP on MBS yields and mortgage rates. Different from their previous researches, they account for the separate QE rounds (QE1, QE2, OT and QE3) by defining a dummy for each round. They conclude that "portfolio rebalancing" channel is a more important consideration for QE transmission than other channels. They also indicate that the "stock" effect dominates the "flow" 3 The stock effect means the effect of increases in the Fed's asset holdings, while the flow effect means the effect of QE announcements.
effect of the Fed's QE on MBS yields and mortgage rates.
Di Maggio et al. (2016) use micro-level mortgage market data to analyze the interest rate movements and the origination volumes of assets in different rounds of QE. They find that the interest rates and origination volumes depend on the segmentation of the market and the types of assets purchased.
QE announcement effects analysis using event studies
A few researchers incorporate event studies 4 to analyze QE effects. Swanson (2011) uses event study to examine the QE announcement effects on Treasury yields during "Operation Twist"
in the 1960's and QE2. Glick and Leduc (2012) consider the first principal component of yield changes of 2-, 5-, 10-and 30-year U.S. bond futures in a 2-hour window (Wright, 2012) as the Fed's QE announcement shock and employ event studies to analyze QE announcement effects on financial market. Patrabansh et al. (2014) use event study method to show how the 10-year
Treasury yield responded to the Fed's QE announcement. Kozicki, Santor and Suchanek (2015) incorporate event studies with GARCH (1,1) model to analyze the Fed's LSAP announcement effects on commodity prices and international spillovers. They find that LSAP announcements did not lead to higher commodity prices in general but appreciated the commodity exporters' currencies and brought gains to their stock markets.
Data
We analyze the 30-year fixed mortgage rate (FRM) 5 as the indicator for cost of financing a single-family house. The corresponding benchmark-30-year Treasury rate is also evaluated.
4 Event study literature and methodology are discussed in Appendix, Part 1. 5 Specifically, the mortgage rate is the daily overnight 30-year US home mortgage national average from Bankrate. Before the initiation of QE, all three yields stayed in high levels. Then they all tumbled during the initiation of QE1, QE2 and OT, rallied to relatively high levels when OT ended, and were gradually declining in QE tapering. During each round of QE, the rates dropped sharply when purchase programs were announced. There is a clear evidence that QE announcements had influences on long term interest rates and spreads. The summary statistics are reported in Table 1 .
Methodology
QE announcement dates for event study
The QE announcement events take several forms including announcements after FOMC meetings, Fed testimonies, Fed Chairman's speeches, Press Conference Reports and Fed minutes
released. An announcement is identified as a QE announcement based on two criteria. First, the announcement should mention the QE program, either an indication of launching a new round of QE or the types and quantities of assets the Fed planned to purchase. Second, the announcement should contain news to the market other than mentioning the same thing as the last QE announcement did.
Without the official version of QE announcement events timeline published by the Fed, we identify the events from previous literature. There is a consensus among previous researchers (Gagnon et al., 2011; Woodford, 2012; Hancock and Passmore, 2015; Glick and Leduc, 2015;  6 It is known as the effect of traditional monetary policy. Hattori et al., 2016; Altavilla and Giannone, 2017 ) that there were a total of 13 QE announcements during QE1 and QE2. We include all 13 events during QE1 and QE2 in this paper. For OT (a.k.a.
MEP) period, we identify three events mentioned in Bowman et al. (2015) and Borrallo et al. (2015) , and one event mentioned in Hancock and Passmore (2015) . Among these four events, two hinted the possible OT program and the other two were official announcements of launching OT.
For QE3, we combine the events mentioned in Bowman et al. (2015) and Hancock and Passmore (2015) and delete one "irrelevant" event 7 to a total of four events. For QE tapering period, the first four events are taken from Altavilla and Giannone (2017) , three of which indicated the decreasing pace of asset purchases and one was the official announcement of tapering. We update the data to include another 10 events concerning stepwise QE tapering procedure until the end of QE program on October 29, 2014. Finally, a total of 35 events is identified and reported in Table 2 .
Event window, OLS issues and GARCH
To measure the effect of QE announcements on the mortgage rate using event studies, we choose three different event window sizes (i.e., 1-day, 3-day and 5-day) 8 for each of the 35 events and run regressions according to each window size. Specifically, 1-day window only identifies the event day on which there was a QE announcement; 3-day window consists of one pre-event day, the event day and one post-event day; 5-day window is comprised of two pre-event days, the event day and two post-event days. The augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests 9 on levels and changes of variables (i.e., 30-year mortgage rate, 30-year Treasury rate and the spread between these two) 7 The announcement on March 20, 2013 is considered irrelevant to QE since it only remarked the improved economic and labor market conditions. It was treated as an unconventional monetary policy announcement (i.e., forward guidance) in Bowman et al. (2015) , but should not be regarded as a QE announcement here. 8 Event windows larger than five days are not considered in my study to avoid the effects of other news. 9 The test results can be found in Table A1 in Appendix.
validate that the changes of these variables are covariance stationary and not over differenced.
Instead of finding the abnormal return (AR) as the difference between the observed and predicted return in traditional way with non-overlapping event windows, we use regression-based event study methodology to allow for overlapping event windows 10 . The coefficient of the event dummy corresponding to event k on day t is the abnormal return 11 ( kt AR ) of the left hand side variable. We run four different regressions and adjust for three different event window sizes (5-day, 3-day and 1-day). The four regressions are  measure the daily abnormal returns of the mortgage rate on day t. Equation (2) 10 From the data, the windows for event on 11/25/2008 and the one on 12/1/2008 overlapped. 11 Usually return means the percentage change of a variable, here I name change of rate as return since mortgage and Treasury rates are already in percent. Also, since "abnormal return" is widely used by researchers doing event studies, it is used in this paper instead of "abnormal change" to avoid confusions. 12 The name "market model regression" can be found in Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009 After adding ARMA and GARCH items to Equation (1) to (4), the complete model is specified as (1 ) (1 ) 
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The trivial impacts are mentioned by Altavilla and Giannone (2017) , we found similar results in robustness check part. 
Results
Individual events
The regression results are reported in Table 3 , 4 and 5 for 1-day, 3-day and 5-day event window cases. we report abnormal returns (ARs) on event days for 1-day window case and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in event windows for 3-day and 5-day window cases 16 . Most of the ARs in 1-day window and CARs in 3-day and 5-day windows for the same event followed the similar signs and significances with few exceptions. The magnitudes of CARs in 3-day and 5-day windows were not always greater than those of ARs on event days for the same event, which suggests the high volatility of ARs within an event window.
Large effects on the mortgage rate were found during the days when new rounds of QE or QE tapering were hinted, the effects from any further news conveying a continuation of the current QE policy dwindled. For example, when QE1 was first announced on 11/25/2008 for purchasing GSE debts and MBSs, ARs and CARs were significantly negative for all three window sizes.
Specifically, AR was -0.121 percent on event day and CAR was -0.149 percent in 3-day window.
For other QE events followed 17 , AR and CARs were all negative but in smaller magnitudes. On 5/22/2013, when Bernanke remarked the potential tapering of asset purchases during his speech, AR went up to 0.068 percent on event day, and CARs were 0.114 and 0.120 in 3-day and 5-day 16 The ARs for calculating CARs can be found in Appendix, The signs and magnitudes of ARs and CARs were not consistent for a few events. When market took days after the QE announcement to absorb the news or the news had been already priced in the days leading up to the announcement, insignificant AR and significant CARs were found for that event (e.g., events on 8/12/2009 and 7/15/2014). When the effect of QE announcement was transitory, significant AR and insignificant CARs were found for that event (e.g., events on 12/12/2012 and 7/30/2014).
Long run effects
Since there are right hand side lagged dependent variables in all four regressions (i.e.,
equation (5)- (8)), the announcement effects on dependent variables will last into the future through 22 An exception is the first QE announcement on 11/25/2008 which announced only MBS purchase, but both mortgage rate and treasury rate had significantly large and negative ARs and CARs.
them. In long run, if we assume a steady state ∆ = ∆ −1 = ⋯ = ∆ −7 , from equation (5) or (6), the total AR of the mortgage rate for event can be calculated as 1, 77
and total CAR of the mortgage rate for event as
TARs and TCARs of treasury rate and spread could also be derived by similar strategy from equation (7) and (8). Given that both TARs and TCARs are non-linear transformations of regression parameters, we incorporate Delta Method 23 to find the asymptotic standard errors for them. Table 6 reports the estimates and standard errors of TARs and 3-day and 5-day TCARs from four regressions.
From Table 6 , TAR and TCARs for the same event had less magnitudes than AR and CARs, while the signs and significances did not vary so much. That being said, although the long run effects of QE announcement on the mortgage rate shrunk in long run, the directions of long run effects stayed the same as short run effects. The muted long run effects are due to the negative autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations within the data series as we found earlier. Moreover, the long run effects were less volatile than short run effects since the standard errors of TAR and TCARs for the same event decreased compared to those of AR and CARs. 23 The Delta Method estimates the standard errors of 1 st order Taylor expansion of () f  , which can be expressed as
. In the equation, () f  is a transformation of regression parameter vector  and
Comparing the results with literature
Next, we aggregate the ARs in each round of QE to find the cumulative effects of announcements. Table 7 reports the cumulative effects 24 for 1-day, 3-day and 5-day window cases from my estimation and the ones from other studies. My estimation is consistent with other studies that cumulative effects on both the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate were greater in QE1 than in other rounds of QE. However, the magnitudes of the effects in QE1 in my study were only half of those in other studies 25 . The evidence suggests that event studies using OLS without controlling for the serial correlation and the conditional heteroscedasticity within the data series overestimate the QE announcement effects on interest rates in general. The spread between the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate increased around days of announcements cumulatively in all rounds of QE except for QE3, which were expected to boost the risk-taking behaviors of investors as a goal of the Fed's QE.
Events grouped by announcement type and QE round
Regressions with grouped event dummies
In order to generalize QE announcement effects on the mortgage rate, we next group all QE events 26 by type of asset purchased (i.e., the MBSs, the Treasury Securities or Both as shown in Table 2 , Column 6), increase or decrease of purchase (i.e., as shown in Table 2 , Column 6), and round of QE (i.e., QE1, QE2, OT, QE3 and tapering as shown in Table 2 , Column 2). Dummy 24 The cumulative effects are graphed in Appendix, Figure A4 . 25 The cumulative abnormal returns of the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate for 1-day window in my study were -23 and -54 basis points, while those in other studies were all around -100 basis points. 26 A total of 31 events are in the sample at this part. As we discuss in Part 5, event on 8/27/2010 is excluded since it is contaminated by better Economy report on the same day. Event on 11/3/2010, 6/20/2012 and 12/12/2012 are excluded given that these 3 events were well expected by the market. In fact, plenty of other researchers exclude those four events in their studies as well. After the deletion, my sample of events is consistent with Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), Bowman et al. (2015) and Borrallo et al. (2016) .
variables are created with value 1 on days of grouped event and 0 on other days. For example, the dummy variable "QE1_MBS_Increase" has value 1 on the days when Fed announced increase of MBS purchases during QE1 and 0 on other days. We replace the individual event dummies in equation (5) to (8) by the new dummies and run four regressions. The regression results for 1-day, 3-day and 5-day windows are reported in Table 8 .
Consistent with the result in Part 5, the events of increase in MBS purchases reduced the mortgage rate more than the Treasury rate, while the events of increase in Treasury purchases reduced the Treasury rate more than the mortgage rate on event days or in event windows 27 . From Table 8 , Panel A, on event days of increase in MBS purchases in QE1 and QE3, ARs of the mortgage rate were large and negative at -0.095 and -0.046 percent, while ARs of the Treasury rate were small and positive at 0.004 and 0.047 percent. In longer window cases from Table 8 The different responses of the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate for those two types of events lead to different movements of mortgage-Treasury rate spread. Generally, the spread 27 ARs and CARs of mortgage rate here are from market model regressions. 28 Events of only increasing Treasury purchases happened in QE2 and OT periods too.
narrowed during events of increase in MBS purchases, while the spread widened during events of increase in Treasury purchases. For the 5-day window case, CARs of the spread were -0.318 and -0.208 percent for events of increase in MBS purchases in QE1 and QE3 respectively. In contrast,
CARs of spread were 0.505, 0.083 and 0.279 percent for events of increase in Treasury purchases in QE1, QE2 and OT correspondingly. The similar results were found in 1-day or 3-day windows.
In other words, the credit risk of holding MBSs over Treasury securities were reduced when the Fed announced to increase MBSs purchases, while the risk was intensified when Fed announced to increase Treasury purchases.
The events of decrease in MBS purchases and decrease in Treasury purchases were not quite consistent with increased purchases. Although the event of decrease in MBS purchases in QE1 lead to positive ARs and CARs of both the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate, the AR on event day and CARs in 3-day and 5-day event windows of the mortgage rate were all less than those of the Treasury rate. Moreover, CARs of the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate were both negative in 3-day and 5-day windows for event of decrease in Treasury purchases in QE1.
QE Tapering events enhanced both the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate, however, the effects were limited. The AR and 3-day and 5-day CARs of the mortgage rate for tapering events were only 0.006, 0.021 and 0.032 percent, while those of the Treasury rate stayed as low as 0.008, 0.009 and 0.000 percent. As we showed in Part 5, although significant and positive AR on the event day and CARs in 3-day and 5-day windows of the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate existed during first few events in tapering period, the insignificant and smaller AR and CARs during latter events diluted the average effects of tapering events.
Evolution of CARs for grouped QE events
To see how the mortgage rate, the Treasury rate and the spread moved on each day in a 5-day event window of grouped events, the evolutions of CARs in a 5-day event window are shown in Figure 2 .
For QE events targeting at both MBS and Treasury purchases (i.e., in QE1, OT and QE3), the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate decreased either on event days or one day after event days.
The decrease of the Treasury rate was larger in magnitude than the decrease of the mortgage rate which is in accordance to Wright's (2012) finding of smaller effects on private sector rates than on Treasury yields of QE shocks. Thus, on average the mortgage-Treasury rate spread expanded on event days and then narrowed the days after.
From Figure 2 , Panel A, during events of increase in MBS purchases (i.e., in QE1 and QE3), the mortgage rate declined considerably on event day and one day after the event day.
Specifically, CARs of the mortgage rate one day after the event day slumped to -0.14 and -0.06 percent for events in QE1 and QE3 respectively. However, from Part 6.1 shows that the tapering announcements had limited effects on the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate. This result also applies to here that the CARs of both rates were trending up in small magnitudes. In addition, Figure 2 shows that the upward movement of the mortgage rate after tapering announcements was more persistent than that of the Treasury rate, which boosted the spread and increased the risk of holding mortgages over Treasury securities.
Robustness Checks
Adding more controls into the model
We check if our model is better fitted by adding more control variables. First, macroeconomic surprises are thought to have impact on interest rate. Patrabansh et al. (2014) and Thornton (2017) mention the abnormal changes of Treasury rate were attributed to both QE announcements and macroeconomic news. However, Altavilla and Giannone (2017) show that the effects of macroeconomic shock were "marginal" on average and the estimation results did not change so much with the inclusion of surprise components 29 . We pick unexpected changes of log(CPI) and unexpected changes of the unemployment rate (UER) to identify macroeconomic surprises 30 .
Second, shocks to the determinants of mortgage rates and MBS yields might affect the mortgage rate. Hancock and Passmore (2011 propose some determinants of mortgage rates and MBS yields, from which we select the control variables by using two criteria. One is that the variables selected should not be significantly affected by QE announcements. The other one is that the variables should contain news about mortgage rates. Only two variables from their study are in line with these two standards, which are Case-Shiller Home Price Index (HPI) and unemployment rate (UER). From Passmore (2011, 2012) , HPI measures the costs of origination and servicing. Along with UER, they both reflect the credit risk of mortgage.
Although the values of three control variables (i.e., ln( ) CPI  , ln( ) HPI  Next, we run the four regressions as equation (5) Table A1 . 32 All three ARMA models are sufficient. From Appendix, Figure A5 and Figure A6 , we can see that the ACF and PACF of residuals in three models for all lags are insignificant. 
Using 10-year instead of 30-year Treasury rate
Since most of the 30-year mortgages are paid off or refinanced within 10 years, the 10-year
Treasury rate is widely regarded as the risk-free rate determining the 30-year mortgage rate rather than the 30-year Treasury rate. In the period of our interest from 1/1/2008 to 12/31/2015, the correlation between the 30-year mortgage rate and the 10-year Treasury rate is 0.912, which is greater than the correlation between the 30-year mortgage rate and the 30-year Treasury at 0.807.
To compare the results, we replace the 30-year Treasury rate with the 10-year Treasury rate in equation (5) and run the regression to find ARs and CARs of the 30-year mortgage rate for grouped events. CARs of mortgage rates from regressions controlling for the 10-year and 30-year
Treasury rate separately are reported in Table 10 .
33 Similar studies using 1-day and 3-day window sizes are done and result in the similar outcomes as the ones without including these 3 determinants in the models, and we don't report the results in this paper.
There is no major difference between the results of regressions controlling for the 10-year
Treasury rate and the 30-year Treasury rate. Both the value and standard error of CAR for same grouped events were similar in magnitude except for events of increase in Treasury purchases in QE1 and increase in both purchases in OT. In fact, CARs for these two grouped events were insignificant and had small values in terms of both regressions with different controls.
Some authors (Sirmans et al., 2015) propose that the 10-year LIBOR swap rate is superior to the 10-year Treasury rate as determination. We replace the 30-year Treasury rate by the 10-year swap rate in my model and find that the results do not vary so much both statistically and economically. In conclusion, it is not much different between choosing the 10-year and 30-year
Treasury rate as the market rate in my model.
Conclusions
This paper uses event study methodology to estimate the effects of the Fed's QE announcements on the 30-year mortgage rate. In the analysis, we apply autoregressive model with IGARCH errors following skewed t distribution to run the regressions with three different window sizes.
We find that although the QE announcements suggesting the start of a new QE round or tapering affected the mortgage rate enormously, the effects from further news conveying a continuation of the current QE policy diminished. Macroeconomic news largely different from the market expectation on the same day of a QE event obscured the QE announcement effect on the Treasury rate, but did not shadow the QE announcement effect on the mortgage rate so much. If the market expectation was in the same direction as a QE announcement, the effect of this announcement on the mortgage rate would be minimized and vice versa. Signs and magnitudes of AR and CARs for the same event might not be confirmative if the announcement effect was transitory or the news had already been priced into mortgage rate before the announcement day.
The calculation of TCARs tells us that although long run effects of QE announcements were less than short run effects, they did not fade away too much. We also find that event studies without controlling for serial correlation and conditional heteroscedasticity within data series overemphasize the QE effects on interest rates in general.
After grouping QE events by the announcement type and the QE round, we conclude that the mortgage rate decreased more than the Treasury rate and the spread narrowed during the events of increase in MBS purchases. Meanwhile, the Treasury rate decreased more than the mortgage rate and the spread expanded during the events of increase in Treasury security purchases. Finally, although QE tapering events had limited effects on both the mortgage rate and the Treasury rate on average, they boosted the credit risk of holding mortgage assets instead of Treasury bonds. The FOMC "will purchase a total of $175 billion of agency debt" instead of $200 billion.
Tables and Graphs
It also "will gradually slow the pace of its purchases of agency debt and MBSs and these transactions will executed by the end of first quarter of 2010." (5) to (8) Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. (5) to (8)) with 3-day event window (i.e., t= -1, 0, 1 Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. (5) to (8)) with 5-day event window (i.e., t= -2, -1, 0, 1, 2 Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. TAR  SE  TCAR  SE  TCAR  SE  TAR  SE  TCAR  SE  TCAR  SE  TAR  SE  TCAR  SE  TCAR  SE  TAR  SE  TCAR  SE  TCAR  SE Row 1 reports the cumulative abnormal returns of the 30-year mortgage rate, the 30-year Treasury rate and the spread between them across all announcements in each round of QE with 1-day, 3-day and 5-day event windows from my estimation. As a comparison, the cumulative effects on mortgage rates and MBS yields found in other literature are reported. The cumulative changes of the 30-year MBS yield and the 30-year Treasury rate are found in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and Di Maggio et al. (2016) , all other studies report cumulative changes of the 10-year MBS yield and the 10-year Treasury rate. For comparison purpose, we only focus on "easing" announcements, four events of decrease in purchases of assets are not used for calculation. In line with the events used in other studies, four events on 8/27/2010, 11/3/2010, 6/20/2012 and 12/12/2012 -7, -38, -37 -23, -63, -56 -54, -76, -58 31, 19, 10 QE2 4, -16, -10 4, -21, -18 -9, -21, -25 9, 4, 12 OT 4, -4, -10 -5, -23, -17 -34, -66, -23 35, 51, 20 QE3 -7, -20, -12 -9, -17, -8 -9, 10, 11 -4, -26, -19 Tapering 5, 49, 107 10, 60, 124 22, 35, 48 -6, 21, 64 Gagnon et al. (2011) Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) , and Events on 6/20/2012 (in OT) and 12/12/2012 (in QE3) are not picked by Bowman et al. (2015) and Borrallo et al (2016) . In fact, as discussed in Part 5, these four events are also the events either contaminated by Economy report release or are already expected by the market. Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1
Figure 2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) on Days in a 5-day Window of Grouped Event
The CAR on each day inside a 5-day event window for grouped events are reported in the figure. Each CAR is calculated as a summation of abnormal returns from two days before the event day (t-2) to the day interested. The region between two dash lines in each graph is the 95% confidence interval of ARs. t indicates the event day. 
Coefficient Estimates of Additional Control Variables in Regressions
The change of log unexpected CPI, the change of log unexpected Case-Shiller House Price Index (HPI), the change of unexpected unemployment rate (UER), and the lagged variables (2 lags for each of these 3 variables) are added to each of the 4 models as independent variables. This table only reports the estimates and standard errors of coefficients associated with these newly added variables by using 1-day event window. ARs, CARs and coefficient estimates of other independent variables are not reported in this Note: ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 levels. 
